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METHODS OF OBJECTING TO PROCESS AND AMENDMENT THEREOF IN WEST VIRGINIA

By LEO CARL.*
This discussion is undertaken with no small measure of apprehension as to whether the writer will be able to make it worth while.
What is to be said, it is feared, may fall largely within opposite
extremes: the one subject to the criticism of dealing too much with
the commonplaces of routine practice; the other open to the accusation of wandering too far into the field of speculation. However,
the comparatively few and brief, but far from simple, statutory provisions involved seem peculiarly susceptible to superficial construction. It is believed that not a few of the local decisions, even
when pr6perly applying the law to the particular facts of the case,
have been guilty of indulging in a delusive generality of statement
that needs qualification. Furthermore, it would seem that the
results obtained in all instances from actual adjudication have not
been entirely harmonious. It is hoped that something of value may
be accomplished, if in no other way, at least by calling attention to
some of the difficulties involved.
METHODS OF OBJECTING TO PROCESS.

At common law, generally, depending upon the circumstances of
the case, two different methods of objecting to the suffieianey of
* Professor of Law, west Virginia University.

Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 1923

1

West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 29, Iss. 4 [1923], Art. 2
WEST VIRGINIA LAW QUArTErLY

original process are prescribed: (1) a motion to quash, and (2) a
plea in abatement. 1 These two methods of attack will be recognized as analogous, respectively, to a demurrer and to a plea in bar
to the declaration. A motion to quash, of course, is proper when the
defect appears wholly on the face of the writ.2 Likewise, since
on a motion to quash the court may look to the declaration, which
is a part of the record, an inconsistency between the writ and the
declaration-technically, a variance-may, it is said, be made the
basis of a motion to quash ;' and, since the defect also involves the
declaration, a demurrer is held to be proper. Professor Minor
says:
"By the common law a variance between the writ and the
declaration might have been taken advantage of by plea in abatement, or by special demurrer, if the variance were merely formal;
but if it were material to the merits, not only by those two means,
but also by general demurrer, motion in arrest of judgment, or
by writ of error." 4
In all instances where a motion to quash is made, since the writ
per se is not a part of the record, it is necessary, as a prerequisite
to making the motion, to have oyer of the writ in order to make it
a part of the record.5 Other matters of defect, which are extraneous to the writ, of course can be brought to the attention of the
court only by a plea in abatement." Here, again, the defendant
should have oyer of the writ and a copy of the writ should be
inserted in the plea.7 Thus, it will be seen that the methods of objecting to process at common law and the matter of determining
the proper method in any particular instance are comparatively
definite and simple.
However, it would appear that this simplicity in the procedure
has existed to some extent at the expense of certain hardships
imposed upon the plaintiff. Both the motion to quash and the
plea in abatement at common law were frequently subject to this

2

21 R. C. L. § 71; 21 STANDARD PROC. 70.
2 Idem.
s Anderson v. Lewis, 64 W. Va. 297, 299, 61 S. E. 160 (1908).
a 4 INon, INSTIzTUEs, 609-610.
S"But the writ can only be inspected (in order to reverse the proceedings), when
it has been made a part of the record, by craving oyer of it; and oyer is not demand-

able after an imparlance, nor after a Vlea in abatement, nor a fortiori, after a peremptory plea. (Com. Dig. Pleader, (p. 2.)).
"If the variance be immaterial to the real merits, it must at common law be
taken advantage of by plea in abatemestc, or by a special demurrer; but if it be a
variance in substance, the party, provided he has put the writ into the record, by
craving oyer of it in time, may avail himself of it by motion in arrest of Judgment,
or by writ of error, as well as by general demurrer." Idem. 1049.
-ee note ., supra.
S
Snyder v. Philadelphia Co., 54 W. Va. 149, 151, 46 S. E. 366, 63 L. R. A. 896,
102 Am. St. Rep 941 (1903), and authorities cited.
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criticism. Actions were abated by plea for defects that were more
or less trivial, unwarranted delay being the result. Not only was
process quashed on motion for matters of little consequence, but,
since a motion to quash could not be heard until a term of court
came on, the latter method of objecting added extra delay to the
inconvenience of suing out a new writ. As a result," came the
enactment of two sections of the West Virginia Code,9 which read
as follows:
"No plea in abatement for a misnomer shall be allowed in any
action; but in a case wherein, but for this section, a misnomer
would have been pleadable in abatement, the declaration and
summons may, on the motion of either party, and on the affidavit of the right name, be amended by inserting the same
therein.
"In other cases, the defendant on whom the process summoning him to answer, appears to have been served, shall not take
advantage of any defect in the writ or re.turn, or any variance
in the writ from the declaration, unless the same be pleaded in
abatement. And in every such case the court may permit the
plaintiff to amend the writ .or declaration so as to correct the
variance, and permit the return to be amended, upon such terms
as to it shall seem just."
The effect of these statutory provisions, as will readily appear,
is far-reaching. It should be noted, however, that the method of
making a motion to quash or of pleading in abatement has not
been changed; and that the statute merely undertakes to prohibit
the use of a motion to quash or of a plea in abatement in certain
instances wherein they were respectively permissible at common
law. Hence, when a motion to quash a writ is made, it is still
necessary, as at common law, to have oyer of the writ.10 Likewise,
when a plea in abatement is filed to the writ it would still seem
to be necessary to have oyer of the writ and to copy it into the
plea," although such a requirement has been criticised as technical
and the court has intimated that it might be dispensed with.'2
8 See

Anderson -v.Lewis, note 3, supra.

9 W. VA. CODE, c. 125 §§ 14, 15.
10 Lambert v. Ensign Manufacturing Co., 42 W. Va. 813, 26 S. E. 431 (1896),
cases cited.

and

Snyder v. Philadelphia Co., note 7 supra, and authorities cited.
12 In Netter-Oppenheimer & Co. v. Elfant, 63 W. Va. 99, 102, 59 S. E. 892 (1907),
Brannon, J.,says: "I have some doubt whether this plea should not incorporate
a demand of oyer in its opening, and then put its averment. Technically I think so.
Form 203 4 Minor. Oyer is a demand to have read what is not a part of the
record, and thus present it, and thus enable one to plead. Stephen on Plead. 88.
The rule book should show oyer and then the plea in abatement. But this is technical, as the record shows both plea and oyer, and they go together."
The last sentence evidently alludes to the fact that oyer of the writ had already
been had as incidental to a motion to quash the writ and that this oyer may also
11
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As to the necessity of oyer, it is worth mentioning that a distinction
may be made between a motion to quash and a plea in abatement.
The latter sets forth the essentials of the writ in its allegations,
and hence the court, without referring to a copy of the writ obtained
by oyer, may be informed as to the substance of the writ constituting the variance or other defect by referring to the allegations of
the plea. However, it is believed to be the better and safer practice to have oyer of the writ and to insert a literal copy of the writ
in the plea in all instances where a plea in abatement is filed to
the writ.
As to the instances, since the enactment of the statute, in which
a plea in abatement to the writ may be filed, it may be said briefly
that a plea in abatement under the statute is still proper in all
instances in which it was proper at common law, except in
the single case of a misnomer. A misnomer was pleadable in
abatement at common law; but under the statute, all that the defendant can do in the ease of a misnomer in the writ-is to make a
motion to amend the writ, and, on making such motion, he is compelled to disclose by affidavit information which will give the
plaintiff a better writ, the affidavit in this respect acting as a
substitute for a plea in abatement, and the plaintiff getting a better
writ by amending the defective one instead of suing out a new one.
It results from what has been said that the principal effect of
the statute is to reduce the number of instances in which at common law a motion might be made to quash the writ; and it will
be noted that the process by which this reduction takes place is to
require a plea in abatement in certain instances where at common
law a motion to quash or a demurrer was proper. Since a plea
in abatement must be filed at rules and a motion to quash can
only be made in court, the policy of the law in requiring these
additional matters to be pleaded in abatement cleaily is to compel
the defendant to raise the objection at the earliest convenient
stage of the procedure, and thus to give the plaintiff an early
opportunity either to amend or to sue out a new writ, or else to
place the defendant in the position of having waived all right to
object.' 3 If such be not the object and effect of the statute, it
would seem to be worse than useless; for it certainly tends to inbe sufficient for purposes of pleading in abatement. However, the court decided that
the motion to quash alone, without the aid of the plea in abatement, was sufficient
to abate the writ. Hence this case is not an adjudication that oyer may be dispensed with in connection with a plea in abatement to the writ. The form in HTm,,
MODERN LAw 6P Assuzipsrr, provides for literal oyer of the writ; while the form

in HOGo, PIMADmG AN Fonms, makes no provision for oyer.
or Assu-seT, 536; HoGG, PL W3NG AND FoRms, 290.
I See Anderson v. Iewis, note 3, supra.
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troduce confusion into matters that were reasonably clear and
definite at common law. The result is that, while the field of
pleas in abatement has been impoverished in the single case of a
misnomer, it has been enriched to the extent that it has been made
to cover exclusively a large part of the field open at common law
to motions to quash. The effect of the statute in the latter respect,
it is believed, may best be considered by dividing all defects
in the writ, other than misnomers, into two classes: (1)
variances between the writ and the declaration; and (2) other defects in the writ, or defects within the writ itself
It is frequently said, loosely, and perhaps thoughtlessly, that
under the statute no objection can be made on account of a variance
between the writ and the declaration except by a plea in abatement.1 4 That the plain language of the statute does not warrant
such a broad statement may easily be demonstrated. Confining a
quotation of the statute to the language applying to a variance
between the writ and the declaration, it reads as follows:
"The defendant on whom the process summoning him to answer,
appears to have been served,", shall not take advantage of . .
.....
any variance in the writ from the declaration, unless
the same be pleaded in abatement."
If the words in the statute in italics had been omitted, then the
general statement that the defendant must in all instances plead
in abatement in order to object to a variance between the writ and
the declaration would have been true; but the effect of the statute with these words in it is that the defendant is compelled to
plead in abatement as to such a variance only when he "appears
to have been served."' 6 The full significance of the phrase, "appears to have been served," will receive consideration hereinafter.
It will suffice to say here that the general legislative intent permeating the phrase, as well as the residue of the statute, is that
a defendant should not be required to plead in abatement as to
any defect in a writ unless it shall appear that he has knowledge
of the existence of a writ with reference to which he can -intelligently adopt some mode of procedure. In fact, it must be conceded that the statute goes very far when it confines the defend"

See point two of the syllabus in Snyder v. Philadelphia Co.. note 7 supra; point

one of the syllabus in Anderson v. Lewis, note 3 supra; HOGG, PLVADING AND FOS.,
59. The rule is correctly stated in point one of the syllabus in Swindell V. Harper,
51 W. Va. 381, 41 S. E. 117 (1902). In. the instances noted, and likely in other

instances where the rule is stated too broadly, the context will indicate that the true
rule was understood and properly applied in the general discussion.
29 Italics ours.
24 See Anderson v. Lewis, note 3 supra, p. 299.
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ant to a plea in abatement even in those instances where he appears
to have been served. Neither the words of the statute nor, it would
seem, its spirit and intent, make any distinction between matters
of substance and matters of mere form. If; in the absence of a plea
in abatement, the statute permits the declaration to vary from the
writ in one substantial particular, why not in another? Under
the operation of the statute, does the process give the defendant
any notice upon which he can safely rely, except to tell him that
he has been sued and when and where he can acquaint himself
with the particulars? 17 If this question be answered wholly or
partly in the negative, may it not be seriously considered whether
the process could be made less deceptive by eliminating some of
its present contents?
As to defects apparent upon the face of the writ itself, the
statute reads as follows:
"The defendant on whom the process summoning him to answer,
appears to have been served, shall not take advantage of any
defect in the writ or return ........
.unless
the same be
pleaded in abatement."
The broad and literal effect of this latter provision of the statute would seem to be to compel the defendant to resort to a plea
in abatement in all instances for the purpose of objecting to defects
within the writ, except in those instances where it shall not appear
that the defendant has been served. The reason for the exception
stated in the statute as to defendants who do not appear to have
been served has already been noted. The question whether the defendant "appears to have been served," of course, must be answered in the first instance by the return of service. In all eases where
the return of service is sufficient, it would seem to follow that the
defendant must appear to have been served. Hence the conclusion may be drawn that the statute compels the defendant to
plead in abatement in order to take advantage of defects in process
in all instances where the return of service is good, and that he still
has his common-law right to make a motion to quash only in those
cases where the return appears to be bad. The extent to which
this conclusion must be modified will receive attention hereinafter. However, it is conceivable that if the defendant should
attack the truth of a return which is regular on its face and show
17 See Richmond & D. R. R. Co. v. Rudd, 88 Va. 648, 14 S. E. 361 (1892).
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it to be false, as he may do under authority of a recent decision, 18
he might then go back of the return and make a motion to quash
the writ, if defective, on the ground that it did not then appear
that he had been served.19 To summarize, it may be said that the
defendant, when the return is bad, still has all the privileges which
he had at common law (1) to make a motion to quash the return
itself and (2) to make a motion to quash the writ, if defective.
However, in order to save the right to the defendant to carry a
motion to quash back of a defective return, the return must be
bad in substance; for the return itself, if merely formally defective,
is not subject to a motion to quash.20
It has already been said that, if the return of service is bad in
substance, since it will not appear that the defendant has been
served, by the plain terms of -the statute the defendant has all his
common-law rights to make a motion to quash; that not only may
he move to quash the bad return, but has the privilege of going
back of the return and moving to quash the writ itself, if defective.
However, the fact that the return is bad does not establish irrevocably that the service was bad. It is familiar law that the utmost
liberality is exercised in granting leave to amend defective returns
at any stage of the procedure when the service has been sufficient.
Let it be supposed that the process and the return are both substantially defective. Under the statute, the defendant still has his
common-law right to make a motion to quash the writ. But further let it be understood that the service was good and that the
plaintiff avails himself of the right to amend the return. Should
the defendant, after the return has been amended, still have a
right to move to to quash the writ? The originally defective
1, Nuttallburg Smokeless Fuel Co. v. First National Bank of Harrisville, 89 W.
Va. 438, 109 S. E. 766 (1921).
The latter case holds, contrary to previous decisIt has
ions, that an officer's return of ervice on process may be contradicted.
been familiar law for some time that a return of service made by a private person may be contradicted. Peck v. Chambers, 44 W. Va. 270, 28 S. E. 708 (1897.)
19 If the truth of the return should be attacked by a plea in abatement, as it seemingly could within proper time limits, and the defendant should contemplate thereafter making a motion to quash the writ for defects therein, it would seem prudent
for the defendant to have oyer of the writ for the purpose of making his motion to
quash before pleading in abatement. This is suggested on authority of the statement made by Professor Minor to the effect that it is too late to have oyer of the
writ after a plea in abatement. See note 5 supra.
2 Barksdale v. Neal, 16 Grat. 814 (Va. 1862).
Of course, If the return of service on process be quashed, the writ Itself can not be
re-served, because its return day has expired; and, unless the plaintiff shall cause
an alias writ to be sued out, the original writ will be quashed and the action
abated. Hence it might be concluded that, if the return be bad, the question whether
the writ can be quashed for defects in it is unimportant. Such, however, is not
always the case. It may often be advantageous for the plaintiff to sue out an alias
rather than a new original writ, as in situations involving the pendency of an
action to support an attachment, Oil and Gas Well Supply Co. v. Gartlan, 58 W. Va.
267, 52 S. E. 524 (1905) ; or in fixing the bar of the statute of limitations, Carter
Coal Co. v. Bates, 127 Va. 586, 105 S. D. 76 (1920). It should be remembered that
an alias or pluries writ stands or falls with the original. German v. Stead, 1 W. Va,
1 (1864).
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return left open the door for a motion to quash the writ. Does the
amendment of the return close the door? The intent and spirit of
the statute would seem to say that it does. Seemingly, if the
defendant knows of the existence of the defective process, it is the
purpose of the statute to compel him either to plead in abatement
or to waive his objection. The originally defective return indicated
that he did not know of the existence of the writ; but the fact is
that he did know of its existence and the amended return shows
that he had such knowledge. To let him come into court under
such circumstances and move to quash the writ, and to sustain his
motion after the return has been amended, would be to permit him
to impose upon the plaintiff the very delay and inconvenience
which the statute intended to avoid. Hence it is believed that,
although the defendant may properly make a motion to quash the
writ when the return is bad, he can not prevail on such motion if
the return be amended so as to show that he has been properly
served.2
What has been said may be taken as leading to the conclusion
that, under the statute, all writs, however defective, will, under
all circumstances, be protected from a motion to quash by a good
return of service; but such has not been the judicial construction
placed upon the statute. For instance, it has been decided that,
regardless of the fact that the defendant may appear to have been
served, a writ which is made returnable more than ninety days
from date may be quashed on motion.22. Likewise, a writ which
fails to indicate when and where the defendant is to appear;23
and a writ which, in violation of the statute, is directed to a wrong
county, provided the defect is apparent on the face of the writ,24
may be quashed on motion. Such decisions may be sustained, and
seemingly are sustained, on the theory that, since the defect renders the writ utterly void, it can not be said, under the very terms
of the statute, that "process summoning him to answer appears to
have been served" upon the defendant. 25 Nor is it illogical to

M An amended return relates back to the time of service. Gauley Coal Land
Association v. Spies, 61 W. Va. 19, 55 S. E. 903 (1906).
2 Coda v. Thompson, 39 W. Va. 67. 19 S. E. 548 (1894) ; Kyles v. Ford, 2 Rand. 1
(Va. 1823).
2 Fisher v. Crowley, 57 W. Va. 312, 50 S. E. 422 (1905) ; Gorman v. Stead, 1
w. Va. 1 (1864) ; Rousey v. Stilwagon, 70 'V. Va. 570, 74 S. E. 732 (1912).
Netter-Oppenheimer & Co. v. Elfaftt, note 12 supra.
The same may be true as to violations of other positive statutory or constitutional
requirements. But it is believed that process directed to a disqualified officer is
not merely because of this fact alone, void, although such seems to have been the
view of the court in Hansford v. Tate, 61 W. Va. 207, 56 S. E. 372 (1907).
It Is
submitted that the true basis of this decision is the fact that the process was
served by the deputy of the disqualified sheriff.

0 Warren v. Saunders, 27 Grat. 259, 269 (Va. 1876).
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conclude that, if what purports to be process is so defective that
it can not properly be considered as process, there is no process in
the case. Hence, under the liberal terms of the statute, in such an
event, it can not be said that the defendant "appears to have
been served."
The defendant may have been served with a paper,
but not with process.
While the rationale of the decisions cited above may be accepted
as logical, and the results may be justified in these and other
particular instances, still it must be conceded that the chief remedial effect of the statute can be placed in jtopardy by an indiscriminate application of the principle involved. In order to entertain a motion to quash, in spite of the statute, it is necesary only
to decide that the process is void, while it may have been the intention of the statute to prevent the court from considering
the defect claimed to make it void except under a plea in abatement. In other words, on the theory that the statute does not
apply to void process, it is always possible to measure the propriety of the method of objecting in terms of the defective subject matter of the objection. The danger lies in letting the nature
of the defect control the method of objecting, which may not have
been the intention of the statute.
Since the decisions justify a rule to the effect that a defendant
may still, under the statute, make a motion to quash when the writ
is void, it is desirable, if possible, to define the meaning of the
term "void."
This term, as applied to process, has been used by
the courts with much lack of precision. 2 In some instances it is
taken to mean merely that the process can not be amended, and
will be quashed if seasonably attacked, although it does not necessarily mean that the process, even in its defective condition, will be
insufficient to support a judgment. 7 In other instances, it means
that what purports to be process is so defective that it can not be
looked upon as process under any circumstances or for any purpose. That the possibility of amendment is not, in all cases, a
proper test as to whether the process is utterly void will appear
more fully later under the discussion of amendment of process.
Of course, utterly void process, like anything else that is utterly
void, can not be amended. But recognition by the West Virginia
decisions of the fact that process may be merely voidable and yet
can not be amended, because to do so would falsify the officer's
r"
Ambler
v. Leach,
15 W. Va. 677 (1879) ; 32 Cyc. 518-519.
27 See
Ambler
v. Leach,
supra.
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return,28 is a sufficient indication that lack of amendability is not
an absolute criterion as to true voidness. A more consistent, although perhaps not very helpful, 29 test would be whether the
defective process would be sufficient to support a default judgment. However, it is doubtful whether such a test could be reconciled with views expressed in the West Virginia decisions. 0 Perhaps after all it will be safer not to go too far in generalization
and to leave the field of construction open for each case as it shall
arise, bearing in mind that the statute should not be so construed as
to destroy its usefulness. It would seem that the court is correct in
holding void any process that fails reasonably to notify the defendant when or where he is to appear. He should know where to go
when summoned and should not be compelled to camp in the clerk's
office in order to discover when or where he will have an opportunity to examine the declaration. There may be more doubt as
to declaring process void merely because it is made returnable
beyond the period of time fixed by the statute, the defendant in
such cases nevertheless having definite notice, and yet such a rule
is not without strong reasons to support it. One reason is the mere
fact that the statute says that process shall not be made so returnable. The fact that failure to comply with some definite statutory
limitation may lead to intolerable abuses is sufficient to suggest
that .the defendant should be granted the broadest opportunity to
object. If any measure of chance should be offered to the plaintiff to escape the limitation imposed by the statute, what would
prevent him from making his process returnable even years from
date, and thus keeping the defendant an unreasonable length of
time in suspense? Again, the fact that amendment of such process after service would lead to an absurdity is worthy of consideration. The remaining instance heretofore noted where the court
has held process to be void is believed to be based on sound logic.
The policy of the law in limiting the direction of process to certain counties is to prevent the plaintiff from dragging the defendant into other counties for purposes of litigation. Although the
defendant may unavoidably find it necessary ultimately to appear in opposition to the course of litigation instituted by process directed to the wrong county, still it would seem that he
2 Laidley's Admr. v. Bright's Admr., 17 W. Va. 779 (1881).
29 " It is said that only those [defects] which affect the jurisdiction will render
the writ void; but this determines little, for the question still arises, what defects
affect the jurisdiction. The matter seems to be largely one 'of precedent rather
than one of principle." 32 CYc. 518-519.
30 Laidley's Admr. v. Bright's Admr., note 28 supra; Town of Point Pleasant v.
Greenlee, 63 W. Va. 207, 60 S. E. 601, 129 Am. St. Rep. 97 (1907).
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239

should have the broadest liberty of electing as to when he will
appear. If he should be compelled to appear in limine and plead
the matter in abatement, as he might if the process were held
merely voidable, he would thus be subjected to the very inconvenience intended to be obviated by the statute.
Conceding the difficulty of attempting to formulate a general
and absolute definition of void process that will serve as a rule of
procedure, yet it is believed that, in order to arrive at a construction of the statute that will harmonize the operation of all its details, it will be found necessary to recognize the potential existence
of three different classes of defects: (1) formal defects; (2) substantial defects which at common law made the process voidable
but not void, and which will still make the process voidable under
the statute by a plea in abatement unless the process be amended;
and (3) substantial defects which make the process void both at
common law and under the statute. In construing the statute, it
would seem to be necessary to recognize that merely voidable process is yet process. If it should appear that the defendant has
been served with process substantially defective, but merely voidable and not void, still, in the language of the statute, it will appear
that "process summoning him to answer appears to have been
served" upon him; and the language of the statute requires that
objection to such defects be asserted by a plea in abatement, or
else waived. There would seem to be no way to escape this conclusion except to come forward with a proposition to the effect that
any defect which has been recognized as substantial at common law
will render the process void for the purpose of determining
whether, under the statute, "process summoning him to answer
appears to have been served" upon the defendant. If this be
true, then the statute, with all its radical effect in regard to
variances between the writ and the declaration, has no effect at all
upon defects within the writ, except mere formal defects, regardless of the fact that a variance between the writ and the declaration
offers greater opportunity for real deception than the majority of
substantial defects within the writ itself.
It must be conceded, however, that the construction contended
for above does not seem to have been followed by.the court. Regardless of the statute, the court has entertained a motion to
quash process, although the process itself was conceded to be merely
voidable and not void, and the regularity of the return indicated
that the process had been served. In the particular case in ques-
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tion,3 ' the clerk had failed to sign the process. The defendant
suffered a default judgment and later made a motion under chapter 134 of the Code to set aside the judgment and .quash the writ
because of this omission. In sustaining the motion, the court recognized the fact that the defect made the writ merely voidable and
not void, and hence that the judgment could not have been attacked collaterally, and could not have been attacked directly if the
period within which the defendant was entitled to make a motion
under chapter 134 of the code had expired. 2 Hence the process
was not void and, although voidable, was still process. Otherwise,
the judgment would have been void for any and all time. Since
there was process and the defendant appeared to have been served
with it, how is it possible to escape the language of the statute
which says that, in order to object in such a case, the defendant
must plead in abatement? Can any distinction, based on the words
or the spirit of the statute, be made between a motion to quash
under chapter 134 of the Code and a similar motion before judgment has been entered? It is submitted that there is nothing in
section 15 of chapter 125 of the Code which will warrant such a
distinction. It would seem that the basic purpose of the statute
would indicate a contrary conclusion. If the defendant can gain
anything through his delinquency in remaining silent and staying
out of court beyond the normal time alloted to him to plead, it must
come, if at all, through chapter 134, which, it must be admitted,
has extended no small measure of kindly indulgence to delinquent
defendants. For instance, West Virginia practitioners must have
long observed that the latter chapter has been so construed as to
give a defendant, merely by virtue of staying out of court and
keeping the plaintiff in the dark, an extra year after judgment in
which to demur to a declaration, in spite of the fact that other provisions of the same chapter would seem to say that objections to a
pleading are waived unless asserted by demurrer before the entry
of judgment. That there is a similar tendency to look upon chapter 134 as qualifying the restrictive force of other statutes placing
limitations upon objections to process, is indicated by the language
of the decision last cited:
"When a judgement is obtained by default, the statute of jeofails has no effect on such judgment, and the Appellate Court
will look into the writ and all the other proceedings." 33
21

Laidley's Admr. v. Bright's Admr., notes 28 and 30 smpra.

'2 Town of Point Pleasant v. Greenlee, note 30 supra; Anmbler

v. Leach, note 26
Supra.
3 See similar statements as to the writ being a part of the record when the Judg-
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Does this statement warrant the inference that section 15 of chapter 125 is a part of the statute of jeofails? Suppose that the court
may look into the writ when the judgment is by default. So may
it upon oyer of the writ and a motion to quash before judgment,
but the conclusion does not follow that a motion to quash is proper.
Is it to be inferred from the mere fact that the court will look
into the writ in the case of a default judgment that the defendant
has therefore waived no right to object and that the writ will be
quashed on motion for defects which do not make it void? Moreover, there is a distinction between a substantially defective declaration and substantially defective, but not void, process. The
process has performed its function when it has given the defendant
sufficient notice, but the declaration is the basis of the plaintiff's
right to recover.
In conclusion, it is submitted that the curative effect of section
15 of chapter 125 of the Code was not intended to be modified by
the provisions of chapter 134, so as to permit a motion to quash
a writ for any defect that could not have been made the subject of
a motion to quash before judgment; and that a motion to quash
can be entertained either before or after judgment only on the
assumption that the writ is void. When the defect does not make
the writ void a motion to quash should be rejected on the theory
(1) that merely voidable process is sufficient to sustain a judgment
and (2) that the defendant has had sufficient notice to compel
him to plead in abatement. This would seem to be the only consistent interpretation of the statute when the defendant has
appeared before judgment; and how or why should either one of
the two considerations mentioned be changed by the mere fact that
the defendant has stayed out of court, subjected the plaintiff to
further delay in the event of a motion to quash, and permitted a
default judgment to go against him? Would there not be even
more reason for refusing a motion to quash after judgment, when
ment is by default In Netter-Oppenheimer & Co. v. Elfant, note 12 supra; Town of
Point Pleasant v. Greenlee, note 30 supra. However, it is said that the writ will be
looked into in the case of a default judgment for the purpose of sustaining the
judgment and not for the purpose of defeating it. See Lambert v. Ensign manufacturing Co., note 10 supra.
In Lynch v. West, 63 W. Va. 571, 60 S. E. 606 (1908), although the language of
the court in connection with the context is not entirely clear, it is said: "Where
there has been no appearance and judgment by default the statute relating to pleas
in abatement will not deny to a defendant his right by motion, under sections 1 and
5, chapter 134, to correct or reverse the judgment for error of fact in the execution
of process, or errors apparent in the execution thereof. In such a case the statute
relating to pleas in abatement has no application." If, as would appear probable,
this language relates to the service, and not to the essentials, of the writ, it would
seem to be correct; for if the return is insufficient, it will not appear that the
defendant'has been served. Likewise, since the return of service appeared to be
bad, it is believed that the court properly permitted the defendant, on motion, to go
back of the return and attack the sufficiency of the writ Itself.
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the defendant has the same notice as before and when the accumulated consequences of his delinquency will impose all the greater
hardship upon the plaintiff ?
A discussion of Laidley's Admr. v. Brigt's Admr. should not
be dismissed, however, without the suggestion that the decision
may be consistently sustained on principles other than those urged
by the court. Some courts have held that process not signed by
the clerk is void. Our own court has so held in effect in deciding
that a summons issued by a justice of the peace and not signed
by the justice does not bring an action into being. 4 Although
such a holding has been criticised as technical, it is not without
reason. The law does not contemplate that a party can issue his
own process and the signature of the clerk is the only authentic
indication on the face of the writ that it has been issued under his
authority.
A-MENDMENT OF PROCESS.

It is believed that the rule as to the amendability of process is
correctly stated in the syllabus of the West Virginia case of Fishter
v. Crowley :35
"A summons commencing an action in a court of record cannot be amended in any substantial particular unless the statutes
of amendment authorize it."
At common law, mere formal defects may be cured by amendment, because the process after amendment is substantially the
same as before; but substantial defects can not be cured by amendment, because, it is said, to do so would be to falsify the officer's
return of service. Process substantially amended is not the same
process as before amendment; wherefore it can not be said that the
amended process was served upon the defendant, and the return
saying that it was so served is false. The common-law rule, however, has been radically changed by statute in West Virginia.
It has already been noted that, by virtue of statute, process may
be amended so as to cure a misnomer. As to other defects, and
variances between the writ and the declaration, it is well to note
again the precise words of the statute :36
"In other cases, the defendant on whom the process summonu Colborn v. Booth, 41 W. Va. 289, 23 S. E. 556 (1895).
Note 23 supra.
W. VA. CODE, c. 125 J 15.
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ing him to answer, appears to have been served, shall not take
advantage of any defect in the writ or return, or any variance
in the writ from the declaration, unless the same be pleaded in
abatement. And in every such case the court may permit the
plaintiff to amend the writ or declaration so as to correct the
variance, and permit the return to be amended, upon such terms
as to it shall seem just."
Taking the common-law rule, to the effect that a writ can not
be amended in any substantial particular, as the starting point, it
is pertinent to inquire to what extent, if any, the statute just
quoted has modified the common-law rule. First of all it should
be noted that the phrase, "the court may 7 permit the plaintiff to
amend," would seem to indicate that the statute intends to let the
discretion of the court control in all instances, where an amendment-is permitted at all, as to whether there shall be an amendment. But doubtless such a discretion must be soundly exercised
and is reviewable. Also, the court may permit the amendment
"upon such terms as to it shall seem just." Since it would rarely,
if ever, seem necessary to impose "terms" where merely formal
amendments are made, it may be surmised that the phrase last
quoted contemplated that substantial amendments may be made.
The word "terms" may be taken as referring to costs and continuances, the propriety of the latter depending upon whether the
defendant has been surprised by the amendment."' It is possible
to look upon the phrase, " in every such case," as being ambiguous.
It may be taken as referring both to defects within the writ and to
variances between the writ and the declaration, or it may be taken
as referring only to variances between the writ and the declaration. The additional phrase, "so as to correct the variance," may
be taken to mean that it has only the latter application, and this
has been the view of the court expressed in at least one case :9
"Sections 14 and 15 of chapter 125 of the Code provide for
the correction of misnomers and variances in the writ and nothing more. Hence, it is probable that they are merely declaratory
of the common law and do not authorize an amendment in such a
case as this."
Again, the phrase, "in every such case," may be taken as referring
to every ease in which there is either a defect within the writ or a
, Italics ours.

8 It would seem that W. VA. CoDE, c. 125, § 12, as to amending declarations,
would offer a fair analogy as to terms of amendment.
31 Fisher v. Crowley, note 23 supra. 1. 318.
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variance--in other Words, to the existence of a defect or a variance-or it may be taken as referring only to every case in which
such defect or variance is pleaded in abatement. The latter view
has been unequivocally adopted by the court in Laidley's Admr. v.
Bright's Admr. :40
"But it should be observed that the court is only permitted to
allow such amendments of the writ, when the defendant has been
served with process, has appeared and pleaded in abatement.
As after such plea had been disposed of, a new process could be
issued and served corresponding with the proposed amended
process, the only effect of this is to save all this trouble, and
the defendant being actually in court and therefore knowing of
the amendment, the statute wisely declares, that he need not
be formally served with process, but he shall be treated as though
served with the amended process; and even then, that this
amendment under these circumstances may not operate as a surprise or injustice to the defendant, the section we have referred
to says, it shall be done only on such terms as the court deems
just. Thus careful has our statute law been in the few cases in
which it permits a summons to be amended."
Yet, as has already been noted, this does not necessarily mean that,
if the defendant should not appear at the proper time and plead
in abatement to merely voidable process, so as to give the plaintiff
at least an opportunity to ask leave to amend and, if necessary, to
sue out a new writ, such process will be held insufficient to
support a judgment and hence open to a motion to quash. It may
be said that, if the defendant does not plead in abatement so as to
show his dissatisfaction with such process and so as to compel an
amendment or an abatement, he may be taken as conceding its
sufficiency without amendment.
To summarize, it may be said that the statute has been construed,
at least by way of dictum, to mean that the court has no power to
grant amendnfents of process in any case except (1) in the case
of merely formal defects and (2) where the defendant has appeared and pleaded in abatement to a variance between the writ
and the declaration. Thus, if the views of the court have been
properly interpreted, it would seem that the statute has been construed so as to give it the minimum of effect as to the possibility of
amendment. Of course, if the pfocess is void, in the sense hereinbefore indicated, it can not be amended. 41 In such a case, there is
nothing to amend. An adequate amendment would be equivalent
40
Note 28,
41 See cases

supra.
cited in notes 22, 23 and 24 supra.
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to a new writ. Furthermore, since the statute is construed as
changing the common-law rule as to amendments only in cases of
variance between the writ and the declaration, substantial defects
within the writ which make the process merely voidable can not
be amended. Hence, as to defects within the writ itself, the common-law rule still prevails to the effect that only formal defects
can be cured by amendment. However, in accord with the construction placed upon the statute as explained, it has been held that
amendments may be made in substantial respects for the purpose
of curing a variance between the writ and the declaration, even
to the extent of changing the form of action stated in the writ."2
On the other hand, even in the case of a variance, it has been held,
at least by way of dictum, that the court has no discretion so to
3
amend the writ so as to introduce new parties plaintiff.
If there can be substantial defects in the writ of such a negligible nature that the statute requires them to be pleaded in abatement or else waived, the possibility of which the writer has attempted to demonstrate, it would seem in accord with justice at
least to leave a discretion in the court to permit such defects to be
cured by amendment when pleaded in abatement. As already indicated, this can not be done. Whether the court is wrong in construing the various and confused terms of the statute so as to deny
permission to amend in such cases would be difficult to demonstrate. If the court is wrong, its error would seem to come from
following too closely the literal words of the statute. If all- students of the law have had as much difficulty as the writer in seeking to understand and reconcile the various terms of the statute involved in this discussion, it would seem that the statute is sadly in
need of revision."'
42 Barnes v. City of Grafton, 61 W. Va. 408, 56 S. E. 608 (1907) ; Ryan v. Piney
Coal & C. Co., 72 W. Va. 630, 78 S. E. 789 (1913); Shafer v. Security Trust Co.
82 W. Va. 618, 97 S. E. 290 (1918).
43 Phillips v. Deveny, 47 W. Va. 653, 35 S. E. 821 (1900).
" It Is believed that the changes made in the corresponding Virginia statute by
the Code of 1919 are inadequate. About the only substantial change made by the
amendment is to insert the word "valid" before the word "process" in the section
corresponding to our section 15 of chapter 125. It Is submitted that the chief effect
of this amendment is to insert one more word that will need construction into a statute that has already offered too many opportunities for construction. It occurs to
the writer that the following, although it no doubt can be improved upon, would
more definitely meet the evils which the statute was intended to obviate:

In other cases, the defendant on whom the process summoning him to answer
appears to have been served shall not take advantage of any defect in the writ
or return, or any variance in the writ from the declaration, unless such defect
or such variance be pleaded in abatement. And in the case of every such defect
or such variance, whether the same shall be pleaded in abatement or not, the
court may at any time permit the plaintiff to amend the writ or the declaration
so as to correct the defect or the variance, and permit the return to be amended,
upon such terms as to it shall seem just. But nothing herein shall deprive the
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defendant of any right which he has by the common law to make a motion to
quash process which is void.
It is realized that the use of the word "void" in the text of the proposed statute
leaves open a large field for construction, but there would seem to be no adequate
alternative. If it should be deemed inadvisable to leave this word entirely open for
construction, the statute might be extended by expressly enumerating certain classes
of defects which shall not make the process void. A precedent for this will be
recognized in the provisions of chapter 125 of the Code dealing with formal defects
In pleadings.
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